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TAKING REGULATORY TAKINGS PERSONALLY: THE
PERILS OF (MIS)REASONING BY ANALOGY
Michael Allan Wolf
In a troublesome area of the law, it is hard for a legal aca-
demic to resist the temptation to attempt to "enlighten" the
judiciary. It has not been the author's practice to date, in rumi-
nating on the profound puzzle of regulatory takings,1 to instruct
judges concerning the errors of their ways.2 Because only an
insider can be truly familiar with the nuances of a specific legal
challenge and owing to a deep respect for the judicial craft, this
writer has resisted the urge to preach. It has been a sufficiently
provocative challenge to interpret the meanings and implications
of decisions such as Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,3
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los An-
geles," Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,5
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,s Yee v. City of
Escondido' and Dolan v. City of Tigard.s However, given that
* Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond. The author thanks
the United States Court of Federal Claims for the opportunity to share these ideas
with prestigious members of the judiciary and with their distinguished guests at the
Spring Symposium, Chief Judge Loren Smith for his friendship and for the example
he sets as a scholar and jurist, and Megan Ford (University of Richmond School of
Law, Class of 2001) for the care and earnestness with which she conducted her
research assistance tasks.
1. Professor Rose has aptly labeled regulatory takings law a "muddle." See
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 561 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid at Threescore Years and Ten: Is This
the Twilight of Environmental and Land-Use Regulation?, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 961
(1996); Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating the
Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996); Michael Allan Wolf, Takings Term II: New Tools for Attacking
and Defending Environmental and Land-Use Regulation, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 469
(1993).
3. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
4. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
5. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
6. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
7. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
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our invitation on this occasion comes from members of the judi-
ciary, it seems suitable, even obligatory, to wax pedantic and
professorial over shortcomings in the Supreme Court's recent
application of regulatory takings principles in disputes concern-
ing personal property and private funds.
The special focus of this Article is on the unfortunate deci-
sion of four Justices in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel9 to apply the
balancing test from Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City'0 and, for only the fourth time in two decades," in-
validate government action using that test. Yet the ultimate im-
pact of the decision to apply real property takings law to alleged
government confiscations of items of personal property and of
money-as evidenced by cases such as Phillips v. Washington
Legal Foundation2 and by post-Eastern Enterprises challenges
to retroactive environmental schemes such as the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA)"-could stray quite far from the area of employee
benefit plans. 4
8. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
9. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
11. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 243 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 713-14 (1987); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
163-64 (1980); cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1010-12 (1984) (recog-
nizing the possibility of a taking under limited circumstances and using Penn Cen-
tral test); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979) (citing, but not
relying on, the Penn Central test in its finding that compensation for taking would
be required).
12. 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (holding that interest earned on funds deposited in
accounts related to the Texas Interest on Lawyers Trust Account ("IOLTA7) program
is private property of the owner of deposited funds).
13. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see United States v. Olin
Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1515 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[We find clear congressional intent
favoring retroactive application of CERCLA's cleanup liability provisions."). As of this
writing, four federal district courts have turned back CERCLA challenges based on
the Eastern Enterprises plurality's critical view of retroactivity. See Franklin County
Convention Facilities Auth. v. American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d
740 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Combined Properties/Greenbriar Ltd. Partnership v. Morrow,
58 F. Supp. 2d 675 (E.D. Va. 1999); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 49 F.
Supp. 2d 96 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 33 F. Supp. 2d
769, 784-85 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
14. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (finding by a plurality
that a federal statute effected an unconstitutional taking by requiring a former coal
operator to provide, retroactively, health benefits for retired miners).
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This Article includes four parts: (1) a defense of the real
property/personal property distinction for a post-
deconstructionist legal world,15 (2) a review of difficulties com-
mon law courts have encountered when applying real property
concepts to disputes over money and personalty,"s (3) an explo-
ration of the "rhetorical mismatch" typified by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's opinion in Eastern Enterprises,7 and (4) a re-
spectful request for judges to resist the temptation to collapse
categories and instead to maintain, or even erect, meaningful
distinctions. 8
A Distinctions that Matter
During the 1970s, while law and economics wove its spell
among many legal scholars on the right, the critical legal studies
("CLS") movement captured the attention of many leftists in the
legal academy. 9 Undoubtedly, legal historians one day will de-
bate whether Karl Llewellyn ° or Jacques Derrida 2' is the true
15. See infra text accompanying notes 19-46.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 47-75.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 76-110.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 111-19.
19. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987):
Critical Legal Studies is not infrequently paired in observers' minds
with Law and Economics, in part because both became prominent as academic
movements at the elite law schools in the middle and late 1970s, in part
because each represented an attack on the dominant law school stance....
Moreover, Law and Economics was frequently thought to represent not just a
new method of thinking about legal issues but a substantive attack from the
right on the consensus views of the propriety of mildly liberal political policy,
while CLS was often seen as the attack from the left on these same policies.
Id. at 114.
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISCHER III ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 49 (Wil-
liam W. Fischer I et al. eds., 1993) ("Announcing 'Legal Realism' as the new move-
ment in law properly fell to one of the Young Turks; and Llewellyn, who was later
acknowledged the chief Realist, was as well-situated for the task as any."); see also
Allan C. Hutchinson, Introduction to CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 6 (Allan C. Hutchinson
ed., 1989) (footnote omitted) ("Is CLS realism rewarmed or realism rejected? It is
both and neither."); KELMAN, supra note 19, at 12 ("CLS has often been seen as the
latest attempt at deconstructive Realist critique, and it is plausible to view its em-
phasis on the indeterminacy of case results and the manipulability of precedent as a
continuation of the Realist project.").
21. See, e.g., Jason E. Whitehead, From Criticism to Critique: Preserving the
Radical Potential of Critical Legal Studies Through a Reexamination of Frankfurt
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ideological godfather of the movement: It is undeniable that CLS
adherents, like the former, are not shy about pointing.out the
political agendas of judicial lawmakers and, like the latter, ex-
plore multiple meanings hidden in ostensibly objective legal
texts.' When viewed through the lenses of neo-legal realism
and deconstruction, many age-old, common-law distinctions are
suspect. Differences that had meaning to earlier generations of
scholars and jurists-such as the distinction between public and
private -have been exposed as outcome-determinative devices
designed to shield hidden biases and prejudices.'
Consider, for example, Duncan Kennedy's take on the issue:
[T]he edifice of categories is a social construction, carried on over
centuries, which makes it possible to know much more than we
could know if we had to reinvent our own abstractions in each
generation. It is therefore a priceless acquisition. On the other
hand, all such schemes are lies. They cabin and distort our imme-
diate experience, and they do so systematically rather than ran-
School Critical Theory, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701 (1999).
[Tihe postmodern school explores legal indeterminacy and ideology to illustrate
the failure of all totalizing rational thought and to show that no objectively
correct legal or political results are possible. It draws its support from the
theories of the decentered postmodern subject offered by Michel Foucault,
Jacques Lacan, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, and others. This
strand of CLS has been in vogue since at least the mid-1980s and is clearly
on the rise.
Id. at 708 (footnotes omitted).
22. Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 4.
(The main target of CLS has been the crucial distinction between law and
politics or, to be more precise, the alleged contrast between the open ideologi-
cal nature of political debate and the bounded objectivity of legal reasoning.
CLS rejects this axiomatic premise of traditional lawyering. . . . Beneath the
patina of legalistic jargon, law and judicial decisionmaking are neither sepa-
rate nor separable from disputes about the kind of world we want to live in.
Legal reasoning consists of an endless and contradictory process of making,
refining, reworking, collapsing, and rejecting doctrinal categories and distinc-
tions. Doctrinal patterns can never be objectively justified and consist of a
haphazard cluster of ad hoc and fragile compromises; legal doctrine is a small
and unrepresentative sample of conflictual problems and their contingent solu-
tion .... ).
23. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1423 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
24. For a recent example of a legal scholar skillfully exploding an historical
legal distinction, in this case between city and suburb, see GERALD FRUG, CITY MAK-
ING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT WALLS 97-99 (1999).
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domly.
The very existence of historically legitimated doctrinal cate-
gories gives the law student, the teacher, and the practitioner a
false sense of the orderliness of legal thought, of our practices,
and of our reasons for those practices. But the particular schemes
adopted convey more particular falsehoods.... The segregation of
real property law from the rest of contract and tort law tells us
that both limitations on contractual freedom and instances of
strict liability with respect to land are a historical anomaly. The
distinction between public and private law replicates the hidden
message of tort versus contract: that the state stands outside civil
society and is not implicated in the hierarchical outcomes of pri-
vate interaction.'
According to this view, lawyers and judges are all trapped in
this categorical paradigm, for our attention is focused on includ-
ing new situations in old categories, rather than on exploring
and perhaps exploding the categories' meanings.
To Kennedy's colleague Morton Horwitz, the shift from cate-
gorical to balancing approaches typifies Twentieth-Century
American jurisprudence:
Nineteenth-century legal thought was overwhelmingly dominated
by categorical thinking-by clear, distinct, bright-line classifica-
tions of legal phenomena. Late-nineteenth-century legal reasoning
brought categorical modes of thought to their highest fulfillment.
By contrast, in the twentieth century, the dominant concep-
tion of the arrangement of legal phenomena has been that of a
continuum between contradictory policies or doctrines. Contempo-
rary thinkers typically have been engaged in balancing conflicting
policies and "drawing lines" somewhere between them. Nine-
teenth-century categorizing typically sought to demonstrate "dif-
ferences of kind" among legal classifications; twentieth-century
balancing tests deal only with "differences of degree."'
Eastern Enterprises is an extension, even an expansion, of the
balancing that typifies so many regulatory takings challenges.
Justice. Oliver Wendell Holmes employed this judicial strategy in
1922's Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' and it received re-
25. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, in CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 139, 142 (Alan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989).
26. MORTON J. HoRwriz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 17 (1992).
27. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general
2000] 1359
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newed strength fifty-six years later in Justice William Brennan's
opinion in Penn CentralY
While the Penn Central multi-factor test contributed a new
catch phrase to takings jargon--interfere[nce] with distinct
investment-backed expectations" -the emphasis on property
values was offset by the recognition that, at times, government
"interference arises from some public program adjusting the ben-
efits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good." 0 In fact, this two-part test (or, based on more recent
Court opinions, three-part test31) combines the competing em-
phases offered in Mahon by Justice Holmes ("while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking"32) and his displeased, dissenting,
Progressive colleague Justice Louis D. Brandeis ("restriction im-
posed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking"3).
It is not difficult to discern why the plaintiffs in Eastern
Enterprises' and United States v. Winstar Corp.35 invoked the
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regu-
lation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."). Contrast this approach with
that taken in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), a prototypical nineteenth-cen-
tury, categorical case:
[T]he present case must be governed by principles that do not involve the
power of eminent domain, in the exercise of which property may not be taken
for public use without compensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of
property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
See also HoRwrrZ, supra note 26, at 28-29 (discussing Mugler).
28. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978). The
test is set out infra, at the text accompanying notes 83-86.
29. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
30. Id.
31. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
32. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
33. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). I have noted elsewhere that the tension
between these Progressive allies has remained in regulatory takings jurisprudence.
See Wolf, Takings Term II, supra note 2, at 498-500 nn.160-66, 499 (Table II).
34. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 517 (1998) (asserting that "the Coal
Act, either on its face or as applied, violates substantive due process and constitutes
a taking of its property in violation of the Fifth Amendment").
35. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). The plaintiffs alleged in the trial court "that the exclu-
sion under FIRREA [Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
1360
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protections of the Takings Clause in their struggle against the
federal government. In recent years, a majority of Justices-led
by Justice Antonin Scalia in Nollan and Chief Justice William
Rehnquist in Dolan5 -- has identified its own distinction, this
one between the minimal judicial scrutiny available in typical
substantive due process and equal protection challenges' and
the subtly heightened judicial role39 (perhaps accompanied by
burden shifts to the private side4 ) deemed appropriate in regu-
latory takings cases.4 '
While mindful of the critical legal scholars' admonitions
concerning the employment of categories and distinctions, I still
believe that the Eastern Enterprises plurality's failure to recog-
nize genuine differences between real property takings and other
alleged governmental confiscations cries out for correction. First,
items of personalty, fungible goods and money typically do not
share the important physical, economic, ecological, psychological
and philosophical aspects of land-raw and developed.42 Collec-
12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.).] of at least some of plaintiffs' supervisory good-
will is in violation of the parties' agreement, and constitutes a breach of contract
and, in the alternative, a taking of plaintiffs' contract rights." Winstar Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112, 114 (1990).
36. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
37. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
38. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Dairy Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (stat-
ing that "the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the Minne-
sota Legislature could rationally have decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable
milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally desirable alternatives"); Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (noting that "[tihe day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought").
39. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 ("[O]ur opinions do not establish that these
standards are the same as those applied to due process or equal protection claims.
To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings field have generally been
quite different.").
40. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 (Trihe city made an adjudicative decision to
condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In
this situation, the burden properly rests on the city.").
41. For a fuller discussion of this shift in scrutiny, see, e.g., Wolf, Fruits of the
7Vmpenetrable Jungle," supra note 2, at 14-20.
42. The notion that land is unique is shared by observers from throughout the
ideological spectrum. For example, Chief Judge Loren Smith, one of the most articu-
late and prominent defenders of private property rights, talks of
functional characteristics that make land ownership and its regulation a
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tively, if not individually, these unique attributes of realty on
occasion justify differential legal treatment. Second, the Eastern
Enterprises holding comes on the heel of a bit of "re-categoriza-
tion" by some of the private property guardians on the Court.
The best example of this recent trend is, of course, Justice
Scalia's identification of the total deprivation "category" in
Lucas.' While the future might reveal this to be the genesis of
a return to Nineteenth-Century modes of legal reasoning, we
should view this development in a more synthetic fashion. Per-
haps Twenty-First-Century jurisprudence-benefiting as it will
from the revelations of critical scholars concerning the malleabil-
ity of language, politics and theory-will be typified by the push-
unique problem. First, the law considers each parcel of land unique. Unlike
money, or most personal property, it is not fungible. Its location can never be
exactly duplicated, and each location has a unique value. Second, the owner of
land rarely has the same degree of liquidity as the owner of personal property
such as stocks, bonds, gold, or the like. If someone does something I object to
near my land, I generally have to deal with that action, rather than shift my
assets. Third, people have deep emotional attachments to land that they rarely
have towards the other common types of wealth. Fourth, a piece of land is
part of a community, always connected to other land, and existing in a matrix
of roads, rivers, and the whole of civilized society.
Loren A. Smith, The Morality of Regulation, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY
REV. 507, 518 (1998).
Defenders of environmental regulations, too, talk of land's special qualities.
See, e.g., Joan L. McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection: Is This
Land Made for You and Me?, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 391 (1999):
Once we recognize that our community extends to the future, that we are
temporary users of the land and that others will use this land after us, it
makes sense to talk about our responsibility to care for the land for their
sake. Since land has this unique characteristic, it naturally follows that there
are restrictions on it that are different from the restrictions on other kinds of
property. If it can be established that land and natural resources are different
from other kinds of property and that there are special obligations to future
generations, then property will need to be reinterpreted within these con-
straints. There is nothing surprising about reinterpretations of property since
attitudes about property and our conception of property are changing all the
time.
Id. at 393.
Not all agree on this point, however. See, e.g., Robert J. Goldstein, Green
Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real
Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 347 (1998). "The belief that land is a
unique type of property which mandates its unique treatment is anything but set-
tled." Id. at 404 n.318 (citing Fred P. Bosselman, Land as a Privileged Form of
Property, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
AFTER DOLAN AND LucAs 29, 42 (David L. Callies ed., 1996)).
43. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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pull of categories and balancing. Certainly the tension between
modes of resolution that are categorical (such as the physical
occupation and total takings situations encountered in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp." and Lucas ) and
noncategorical (such as the ad hoc, balancing test employed in
Penn Central") pervades current regulatory takings law.
B. (Mis)Reasoning by Analogy
In the Anglo-American legal system, compensation for the
affirmative taking of personal property by a sovereign is at least
as old as Article 28 of the Magna Carta, which forbade Crown
officials from taking "corn or other chattels of any man without
immediate payment, unless the seller voluntarily consent[ed] to
postponement of payment."47 American courts have long applied
eminent domain law to a wide range of property other than
realty, including laundry trade routes" and a National Football
League franchise.4 9 This in itself is not problematic. What is
troublesome, particularly in the regulatory takings context, is
that courts have exported outcome-determinative tests and for-
mulas developed in the real property context to inappropriate
settings.
This phenomenon is not new in American property law, as
evidenced by the conceptually awkward history of joint tenancy
bank accounts and adverse possession of personal property. In
both of these areas, as in other realms of private and public law,
courts, when faced with a legal challenge that tests the limits of
the legal status quo, have attempted to resolve such cases of
first impression by employing the familiar device of reasoning by
analogy.' Unfortunately, owing primarily to important differ-
44. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) ("Our cases further establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the ex-
treme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred.").
45. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("The second situation in which we have found
categorical treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically benefi-
cial or productive use of lan").
46. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
47. MAGNA CARTA art. 28, translated in A.E. DICK HowARD, MAGNA CARTA TEXT
AND COMMENTARY 33-52 (1964).
48. See Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
49. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
50. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUC-
136320001
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ences between real and personal property, the analogy fails, and
later courts, sometimes with legislative assistance or encourage-
ment, have had to repair the damage by developing a new mode
of analysis more suited to goods and money. This Article offers
two examples to illustrate the point.
Joint tenancy with right of survivorship is one of the many
elements of English real property law that made its way across
the Atlantic."' Planted in New World soil, the concept took root
in a variety of contexts, the most common of which is bank ac-
counts.52 Rather than relying solely on a modification of per-
sonal property law regarding gifts,' courts invoked the name
and structure of joint tenancy in an effort to satisfy the desires
of depositors interested in the seamless passage of money to the
survivor between or among co-owners.' It soon became appar-
ent, however, that the fungible nature of money and the ease
with which one party -could deplete the jointly held account to
the detriment of co-owners' presented a dramatic contrast
TION TO LEGAL REASONING 86 (1996) ("The second form of reasoning through which
lawyers apply law to facts is reasoning by analogy."); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REA-
SONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 62-100 (1996) ("Analogical Reasoning").
51. See, e.g., II AMERICAN LAW ON PROPERTY § 6.1 (1952) (British origins of
joint tenancy); 7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 19 615[1l (1999) (British origins of joint
tenancy); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.3 (2d ed. 1993).
52. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 51, § 5.3, at 193-94 n.4. ("By the
terms of the bank's signature card or its savings account book or certificate of de-
posit, the account is described as 'joint' or the co-creditors are described as joint
tenants.); see also N. William Hines, Personal Property Joint Tenancies: More Law,
Fact, and Fancy, 54 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1970):
The difficulty the courts have had with joint accounts can be traced
primarily to the insistence on forcing an essentially novel ownership arrange-
ment into the mold of an existing set of legal principles. The joint account is
fundamentally neither a common law joint tenancy, an ordinary inter vivos
gift, a trust nor a will, yet it partakes of the features of all of these.
53. Cf RAY A. BROWN, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.3 (3d ed. 1975)
("Gifts of shares of stock, savings bank accounts, and life insurance contracts....
54. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 52, § 5.3, at 193-94. The right of
survivorship is an incident of joint tenancy ownership by which "the last surviving
joint tenant [becomes] the sole owner of the entire estate in severalty." Id. at 193.
The rationale is that, when only one joint tenant remains alive, "his original interest
in the entire estate [is] left as the only interest. . . . " Id. at 194.
55. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Silverstein, 393 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(involving a father who withdrew all of the funds from a joint savings accounts that
he had set up with his daughter); Kleinberg v. Heller, 345 N.E.2d 592 (N.Y. 1976)
(involving a niece who withdrew excess funds from a joint savings account set up by
her elderly aunt).
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with the real property situation, in which each party has the
legal right to occupy the entire parcel.'
New York courts and legislators have been wrestling with
the legacy of this misplaced analogy for decades, as illustrated
by the following excerpt from a 1967 New York case, In re Estate
of Kramer:5 7
Perhaps in no other area of the law governing distribution of
a decedents property has so much confusion arisen as in respect
of the rules to apply to a joint bank account when one depositor
has withdrawn funds without the consent of the other.... Some
of the difficulty may be traced to the statutory conclusive pre-
sumption in the case of joint savings accounts (which was re-
pealed by L.1964, ch. 157) and the unwillingness of the courts to
apply that presumption to funds that had been withdrawn from
the account during the lifetime of both depositors.'
The court identifies the culprit in the paragraph that follows:
Perhaps some of the difficulty also flows from the attempt to
apply to such joint owners the same principles of law that govern
joint tenants of realty. Differences in the form of the property cre-
ate practical problems in relation to the one that could not con-
ceivably arise in the other.... [I]t is often stated as an estab-
lished rule that one who withdraws more than his moiety is liable
to the other for the excess over his one-half share. Yet it is just as
firmly established that the surviving depositor may recover from
the estate of the deceased depositor the entire amount withdrawn
from the joint account if he elects to hold the withdrawal as un-
authorized.59
Given this judicial and legislative tinkering, particularly
with laws designed to protect depository institutions from poten-
tial liability stemming from "excess" withdrawals," the joint
56. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 52, § 5.3, at 194 (stating that joint ten-
ants have "equal rights of possession and enjoyment).
57. 282 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1967).
58. In re Estate of Kramer, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 915 (citations omitted); see also Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Televi-
sion, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 349 (1998) (using "one Moiety" to mean "half"); Moore v.
Glotzbach, 188 F. Supp. 267, 968 (E.D. Va. 1960) ("At common law spouses were
considered as one person. They could not hold the estate by moieties as joint tenants
or tenants in common-both were seized of the entirety. . . . ") (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., N.Y. [BANKING] LAW § 675 (McKinney 1999).
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tenancy bank account now bears little resemblance to its older,
real-property cousin. It probably would have been better for
depositors, their lawyers, judges and lawmakers if the analogy
had never taken hold.
The same can be said for another example of judicial "bor-
rowing" from real property principles-adverse possession of per-
sonal property. The concept is deceivingly simple (which proba-
bly explains its initial popularity): If one can acquire ownership
of land and attachments by demonstrating actual, continuous,
open and exclusive use for a period in excess of the statute of
limitations for ejectment or actions for possession of real prop-
erty,6 ' why not allow the same relief for one who holds the per-
sonal property belonging to an equally neglectful owner?
The early history of adverse possession of personal property
in America is tainted significantly, as the concept arose fre-
quently in the context of slaveholders seeking to recover their
human "property."" Today, the concept remains problematic,
chiefly because it has been employed by possessors of stolen
items of artistic, historical, and cultural significance.' As in
the area of joint tenancy bank accounts, the pattern has been
widespread acceptance of the analogy to real property and use of
real property formulas and principles in the personal property
context, followed by serious questioning and, ultimately, devel-
opment of significant judicial and legislative modifications that
reflect the meaningful distinctions between realty and personal-
ty.
One late Twentieth-Century case that typifies the final
61. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 52, § 11.7, at 808.
62. See, e.g., Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 494 S.W.2d 452 (Ark. 1973).
There is no dispute but that title to personal property can be acquired by
adverse possession, nor is it disputed that the applicable statute of limitations
is three years, i.e., adverse possession for more than that period of time would
vest title in the adverse possessor. Only one Arkansas case on this point,
involving a slave, was cited by the parties, but our research has resulted in
revealing four cases relating to this question. All of these cases occurred prior
to the Civil War and three of them also involved the ownership of slaves.
Henderson, 494 S.W.2d at 459.
63. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg, 917
F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the statute of limitations for replevin had not
run against a church whose sixth-century mosaics in northern Cyprus had been
stolen).
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phase of this process is O'Keeffe v. Snyder." The New Jersey
Supreme Court found itself in a conceptual minefield in its at-
tempt to determine the ownership of three paintings by the
artist Georgia O'Keeffe." Compounding the difficulty, this at-
tempt took place after thirty-four years and at least two other
"possessors" after the paintings allegedly were stolen. In its
holding, the majority rejected the notion of adverse possession of
chattels and adopted the discovery rule from tort law, making a
clean break from the past.' The following excerpts reveal how
the differences between realty and personalty cried out for dif-
ferential treatment.
First, the court reviews the prevailing rule: "To establish
title by adverse possession to chattels, the rule of law has been
that the possession must be hostile, actual, visible, exclusive,
and continuous." Second, the court highlights difficulties en-
countered in applying that rule:
[T]here is an inherent problem with many kinds of personal
property that will raise questions whether their possession has
been open, visible, and notorious. In Lesnevich [Joseph v.
Lesnevich, 153 A.2d 349 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)], the
court strained to conclude that in holding bonds as collateral, a
credit company satisfied the requirement of open, visible, and
notorious possession.'
Third, the opinion reviews some of the meaningful differences
between realty and personalty:
Other problems with the requirement of visible, open, and
notorious possession readily come to mind. For example, if jewelry
is stolen from a municipality in one county in New Jersey, it is
unlikely that the owner would learn that someone is openly wear-
ing that jewelry in another county or even in the same municipal-
ity. Open and visible possession of personal property, such as
64. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
65. See O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 867.
66. See id. at 872-73; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 166-68 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that, by applying the
discovery rule, "the statute [of limitations is tolled] until the plaintiff has in fact
discovered that he has suffered injury, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered W).
67. O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 870.
68. Id. at 871.
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jewelry, may not be sufficient to put the original owner on actual
or constructive notice of the identity of the possessor.
The problem is even more acute with works of art. Like
many kinds of personal property, works of art are readily moved
and easily concealed. O'Keeffe argues that nothing short of public
display should be sufficient to alert the true owner and start the
statute running.'
Fourth, the court introduces and justifies the new approach:
We are persuaded that the introduction of equitable consider-
ations through the discovery rule provides a more satisfactory
response than the doctrine of adverse possession. The discovery
rule shifts the emphasis from the conduct of the possessor to the
conduct of the owner. The focus of the inquiry will no longer be
whether the possessor has met the tests of adverse possession,
but whether the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing
his or her personal property.
The discovery rule will fulfill the purposes of a statute of
limitations and accord greater protection to the innocent owner of
personal property whose goods are lost or stolen. Accordingly, we
overrule Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Society, [28 A.2d 189
(N.J. 1942)], and Joseph v. Lesnevich, [153 A.2d 349 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1959)], to the extent that they hold that the doc-
trine of adverse possession applies to chattels."
Finally, the court leaves intact adverse possession as applied to
realty:
The considerations are different with real estate, and there is
no reason to disturb the application of the doctrine of adverse
possession to real estate. Real estate is fixed and cannot be
moved or concealed. The owner of real property knows or should
know where his property is located and reasonably can be expect-
ed to be aware of open, notorious, visible, hostile, continuous acts
of possession on it.7
O'Keeffe is by no means the only decision or authority that ques-
tions the real property approach to adverse possession of person-
alty.72 Other examples of such tinkering include introducing the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 872-73.
71. Id. at 873.
72. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyrpus v. Goldberg, 917
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"demand and refusal" requirement and questioning the prac-
tice of allowing adverse possessors to "tack" their period of pos-
session onto the time of prior possessors.74 Once again, as with
joint tenancy bank accounts, the decision to collapse property
categories into one analytical box has proven unworkable.'
F.2d 278, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1990) (using a rule of discovery to resolve ownership of
stolen mosaics); see also RI.L Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook
Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1221 (1985-86).
73. See, e.g., Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d
Cir. 1982) (noting that "[u]nder New York law an innocent purchaser of stolen goods
becomes a wrongdoer only after refusing the owner's demand for their return. Until
the refusal the purchaser is considered to be in lawful possession."); see also Steven
A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE
L.J. 2437, 2444-46 (1994).
74. Professor Ames's discussion of tacking in, adverse possession involving per-
sonalty, though controversial, remains the classic text on the topic. See J. B. Ames,
The Disseisin of Chattels II, 3 HARV. L. REV. 313, 322-26 (1890); see also Patty
Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 119
(1988-89):
The ability of a possessor to add his or her time of possession to that of
a prior possessor so that the total comprises the time period required for the
running of the statute of limitations is known as "tacking" and is applied in
the doctrine of adverse possession of real property. Its analogous application to
the adverse possession of personal property has been largely accepted by the
courts, although it has also been the topic of some scholarly debate.
Although tacking is almost universally accepted for adverse possession of
real property, this has not been the case for personal property.
Id. at 145-46 (footnote omitted).
75. The pattern of (mis)reasoning by analogy described here haunts American
commercial law as well, particularly in the area of commercial leasing. See Amelia
H. Boss, The History of Article 2A" A Lesson for Practitioner and Scholar Alike, 39
ALA. L. REV. 575 (1988):
The law governing leases of personal property never achieved the sophistica-
tion characteristic of the law of realty leases. Personal property leases or
"chattel" leases were relegated to the relatively obscure and ancient law of
bailments, which in turn encompassed such divergent transactions as the
pledge, the entrusting of goods to a carrier or a warehouse, gratuitous loans of
chattels, and chattel leases. Although some forms of bailments eventually spun
off into distinct transactions governed by separate bodies of law, personal
property or chattel leases remained subject to the general law of bailments,
complete with its Roman origins. Because of the limited precedential value of
bailment law, courts were forced to resort to the common law of contracts, to
analogize to the real property leasing rules, or to apply the rules of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (both those rules applicable to sales and those applica-
ble to secured transactions), either outright or by analogy. The result of this
ad hoc approach was far more than a lack of uniformity from state to state;
the result was an inability to accurately predict the outcome of any particular
leasing issue.
Id. at 578-79 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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C. Eastern Enterprises as Another Mismatch
Faced with an apparent confiscation of Eastern's funds by
an Act of Congress," four Justices of the Supreme Court turned
to the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause 77 to resolve the issue.
Justice O'Connor's discussion begins with the acknowledgment
that "[t]his case does not present the 'classic taking' in which the
government directly appropriates private property for its own
use"78 and with the important qualification that "takings
problems are more commonly presented when 'the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and goods of economic life to
promote the common good.'"79 It would have been better for the
course of regulatory takings law if she and her colleagues had
heeded these warning signs and proceeded down a different
path.
While the plurality opinion cites a wide variety of takings
cases,"o Justice O'Connor relies primarily on the "ad hoc" fac-
tors derived from Penn Central"' and filtered through the
Court's opinion in Kaiser Aetna. 2 The following is an edited
version of the original Penn Central formula that highlights the
factual and conceptual distinctions between the cases cited by
the Penn Central Court and a regulatory takings case involving
See also William R. Theiss, Security Aspects of Equipment Leasing, 1962 U.
ILL. L.F. 77. "A personal property lease is a legal misfit. The relationship of lessor
and lessee is a real property concept producing legal consequences peculiarly inap-
propriate to problems involving personal property." Id. at 77.
76. See Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 ("Coal Act"), 26 U.S.C.
§§ 9701-9722 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), discussed in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498 (1998).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
78. Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 522.
79. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (citation omitted)).
80. See, e.g., Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 521-22 (citing Babbitt v. Youpee, 519
U.S. 234, 243-45 (1997); id. at 522 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124); id. at 530
(citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982));
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987).
81. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24.
82. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979) (using a
variation of the Penn Central test).
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funds or fungible goods:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable
difficulty. While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth
Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,"
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) [(finding a
taking when the federal government took title to boats on which
plaintiffs had material hens)], this Court, quite simply, has been
unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice
and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. See Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) [(finding no taking when
town regulated dredging and pit excavation on real property)].
Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case." United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) [(holding
that a War Production Board order closing gold mines did not
effect a taking)]; see United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149,
156 (1952) [(finding no taking in the army's destruction of water-
front terminal facilities to prevent property from falling into ene-
my hands)].
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Coures decisions have identified several factors that have particu-
lar significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimante and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distincte investment-backed expectations'
83. This Js the first factor, according to the Eastern Enterprises plurality. See
Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 523 ("We have identified several factors, however, that
have particular significance: 'the economic impact of the regulation, its interference
with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmen-
tal action.").
84. The Kaiser Aetna Court says "reasonable," not "distinct." See Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 175. The plurality follows its lead.
85. Although this appears to be subsumed under the first factor, the plurality
identifies this as the second factor, see supra note 83, evidently because of the way
that the test was presented in Kaiser Aetna. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175
(stating that there are several factors to consider when determining whether there is
a regulatory taking- "the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with
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are, of course, relevant considerations. See Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, supra, 396 U.S. at 594 [(real property case already
cited)]. So, too, is the character of the governmental action [(al-
though, according to Penn Central, this appears to be the second
factor, it is identified as the third by the plurality)]. A "taking"
may more readily be found when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, see,
e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) [(finding that
military flights over the plaintiffs home and chicken farm effect-
ed a taking)], than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.'
To apply the Penn Central test mechanically outside the real
property "comfort zone" is a fundamentally flawed strategy.
First, in a regulatory takings case involving real property, "eco-
nomic impact" is measured, not by dollar value lost in the ab-
stract, but by comparing the value of the property before and
after regulation, considering the "parcel as a whole."87 It is a
dramatically different matter, however, when, as in Eastern
Enterprises, fungible funds are the subject of the alleged taking.
No comparison is warranted, and the result is that the Justices
are quite impressed with the plaintiffs significant monetary
loss."
The "second"89 factor, interference with investment-backed
expectations, is equally problematic in the non-realty context. In
the typical regulatory takings case, this language, particularly
the adjective "investment-backed," serves as a warning to land-
owners and developers that they will not be allowed to bootstrap
themselves into a taking by increasing the value of the realty
despite, or in anticipation of, an otherwise valid regulation.
When the subject matter of the alleged taking is money, howev-
reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental
action. . . ").
86. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 123-24.
87. Id. at 130-31 ("In deciding whether a particular governmental action has
effected a taking, this Court focuses ... both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole. . . .).
88. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 529 (stating that the plaintiff's loss would
be "on the order of $50 to $100 million.").
89. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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er, the "investment-backed" notion is typically irrelevant.' This
leaves the Eastern Enterprises plurality free to invoke the mud-
dled law of retroactivity"' in order to explain the word "expecta-
tions."
Finally, Justice O'Connor uses the phrase "quite unusual" to
characterize "the nature of the governmental action."2 This
short appraisal is in sharp contrast to the analysis called for by
the original language from Penn Central that she quotes later in
the opinion." Indeed, a government-compelled, physical occupa-
tion-while easy to imagine for real property and some items of
personal property-is almost an absurd notion when the subject
is money.
Compounding the misreasoning by analogy problem is the
fact that the Penn Central test is not the only regulatory takings
formula that is an uncomfortable fit outside the real property
context. The following .quotations are distilled from regulatory
takings cases decided by the United States Supreme Court over
the past seven decades. Consider the dramatically different
meanings evoked by the various italicized phrases when a dis-
pute involves realty and discrete items of personalty, as opposed
90. There may be a meaningful difference here between fungible goods and
money. For example, consider a speculator in pharmaceuticals who purchased thou-
sands of fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine pills (when the two drugs are taken
together they are known as fen-phen). The purchase was made with the hope that,
given the national obsession with weight-loss, the pharmaceuticals would increase in
value significantly before they were sold. When the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"), in September 1997, asked manufacturers of the two drugs to withdraw
their products from the market voluntarily, this would have had a devastating effect
on our speculator. See FDA Announces Withdrawal Fenfluramine and
Dexfenfluramine (Fen-Phen) (visited Nov. 16, 1999) <http'//www.fda.gov/cder/news/
phen/fenphenpr81597.htm>. One might argue that this was an interference with
investment-backed expectations, especially if the speculator could not find any buyers
for the fen-phen. However, the public-nuisance-like motivation for the government's
withdrawal decision would probably ultimately doom any regulatory takings chal-
lenge. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)
(noting, in a case involving regulation of land use, that "[a]ny limitation so severe
cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership").
91. See Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. at 536.
92. Id. at 501.
93. See id. at 522 (contrasting '"physical invasion[s]"' with "public program[s]
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life") (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
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to fungible goods and money:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law.9'
It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily
speaks as a prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid
exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the
property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitu-
tional.95
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender
of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint
upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on
one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one
traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At
least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights,
the destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, be-
cause the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.9'
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so univer-
sally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation. This is not a case in which the Govern-
ment is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will
cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private proper-
ty; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this
context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately
owned marina.97
The application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.9'
94. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (emphasis added).
95. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (emphasis added).
96. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (emphasis added).
97. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted).
98. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (emphasis added) (cita-
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[W]e have long considered a physical intrusion by govern-
ment to be a property restriction of an unusually serious char-
acter for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further estab-
lish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of
a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred."
With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is
central to the very definition of the property interest."°
Mn practical terms, the support estate has value only insofar
as it protects or enhances the value of the estate with which it is
associated. Its value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights
possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface. Because
petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all of the coal in
their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support
estate does not constitute a taking.'
IT]he regulation here amounts to virtually the abrogation of
the right to pass on a certain type of property-the small undi-
vided interest-to one's heirs. In one form or another, the right to
pass on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of
the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times."°
These cases reflect the fact that "temporary" takings which,
as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clear-
ly requires compensation."°'
We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for
tions omitted).
99. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(emphasis added).
100. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (emphasis added).
101. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 501 (1987)
(emphasis added).
102. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (emphasis added).
103. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 318 (1987) (emphasis added).
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purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent
and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property
may continuously be traversed, even though no particular indi-
vidual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the pre-
mises."°
The Escondido rent control ordinance, even considered
against the backdrop of California's Mobilehome Residency Law,
does not authorize an unwanted physical occupation of petitioners'
property. It is a regulation of petitioners' use of their property,
and thus does not amount to a per se taking."'
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use inter-
ests were not part of his title to begin with.106
Cases such as Eastern Enterprises, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies
Inc. v. Beckwith °7 and Phillips v. Washington Legal Founda-
tion."° indicate that, when it comes to challenging allegedly
confiscatory governmental practices, several Justices are at ease
with collapsing categories and distinctions. This commentator
believes that in doing so, the Court is following a regrettable
pattern that troubles the joint tenancy and adverse possession
fields. While the immediate goal might be tempting (allowing
litigants to receive the heightened scrutiny and burden shifts
provided by Nollan and Dolan), ultimately the Court will find
itself enmeshed in a conceptual morass similar to that confront-
ed by common-law courts, as represented by the decisions in
104. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) (emphasis
added).
105. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992) (emphasis added).
106. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (em-
phasis added).
107. 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (holding that a county's statutory claim to interest ac-
crued on court interpleader funds effected a taking).
108. 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (holding that, under Texas law, interest accrued on
funds deposited in IOLTA accounts is the private property of the owner of the
funds).
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Kramer"° and O'Keefe."'
D. A Humble Invitation
The Supreme Court Justices have three advantages over the
jurists in Kramer and O'Keeffe. First, although Fifth Amend-
ment, regulatory takings law is at least seventy-seven years old
(if we identify Mahon as the parent), there is a manageable
number of problematic (and hence correctable) cases involving
the collapse of categories described in this Article. In other
words, the problem identified in this Article has not, to borrow
from Justice Holmes, "gone too far."
Second, there are at least two historically relevant and
conceptually sound protections already available for parties
caught in a confiscatory bind similar to that in Eastern Enter-
prises. Judges should remember the warning shot fired by the
Justices in Nectow v. City of Cambridge,"' a case decided
merely two years after the Court, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.,"2 provided constitutional protection for zoning in theory.
In Nectow, the Court determined that the zoning as applied to
the complainant amounted to an arbitrary, irrational and confis-
catory abuse of the police power, thus depriving the landowner
of property without due process."' Over the past two decades,
109. In re Estate of Kramer, 282 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sur. Ct. 1967).
110. OKeeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
111. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
112. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
113. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928):
The attack upon the ordinance is that, as specifically applied to plaintiff in
error, it deprived him of his property without due process of law in contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general
rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlim-
ited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does
not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. Here, the express finding of the master... is that the health, safety,
convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city
affected will not be promoted by the disposition made by the ordinance of the
locus in question... That the invasion of the property of plaintiff in error
was serious and highly injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary
basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning
authorities comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be
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we have seen increasing use of "rational basis with bite"'14 in
equal protection cases such as Town of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,"' and in substantive due process cases."6 Giv-
en this increased judicial oversight, there would appear to be no
genuine need to increase the level of scrutiny in recognition of
any fundamental right to own or use property. Judicial enforce-
ment of the Contracts Clause".7 against offending governmen-
tal agencies can also provide the necessary protection for busi-
nesses caught in the tangle of misguided and confiscatory
restrictions."'
sustained.
Nectow, 277 U.S. at 185, 188-89. (citation omitted).
114. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 684 n.45
(1995) (noting that "Professor Gerald Gunther coined the phrase rationality review
with 'bite' in an article reviewing the Court's 1971 Term") (citing Gerald Gunther,
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-48 (1972)).
115. 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985).
The question is whether it is rational to treat the mentally retarded different-
ly .... At least this record does not clarify how . . . the characteristics of the
intended occupants of the Featherston home rationally justify denying to those
occupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the same site for
different purposes.
116. See, e.g., Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
515 U.S. 1131 (1995) (involving homeowners who successfully argued that the denial
of a street excavation permit to connect homes to a public water system was a sub-
stantive due process violation); DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592,
601 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 937 (1995) (holding that a landowner
states a substantive due process claim where he or she alleges that the deci-
sion limiting the intended land use was arbitrarily or irrationally reached.
Where the plaintiff so alleges, the plaintiff has, as a matter of law, impliedly
established possession of a property interest worthy of substantive due process
protection.)
(footnote omitted). For a case involving arbitrary and discriminatory local land-use
regulation that should have been decided in favor of the developer on substantive
due process grounds, see City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687
(1999) (holding that it was proper to submit questions regarding a regulatory taking
to the jury; trial judge had decided a substantive due process claim in favor of city).
The author is currently at work on an article proposing an alternative to
"standardless" substantive due process of land-use and environmental regulation.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. ("No state shall . . . pass any . . . law im-
pairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.").
118. While the Contracts Clause does not have the same clout it did during the
laissez-faire excesses of the late Nineteenth-Century, as Professors Nowak and Ro-
tunda have noted, "speculation of the contract clause's complete demise, however,
proved premature." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
412 (5th ed. 1995); see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977);
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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Third, we must remember that, unlike the state law of real
and personal property, federal constitutional law is, absent con-
stitutional amendment, under the nearly exclusive control of the
Justices. The Court therefore need not worry about their rulings
being neutralized by legislation passed at the behest of interest
groups that are displeased with judicial efforts to bring sense
where confusion now reigns (such as the bankers and advocates
of owners of stolen art who have clamored for legislative change
in joint tenancy and adverse possession law.)..9
So far, in cases such as Eastern Enterprises and Phillips,
the Court has taken a few tentative steps down a road fraught
with unnecessary confusion md tortured logic. If the goal is
correcting costly and irrational government overreaching at the
expense of private businesses, there are alternatives that are
equally effective at chilling such misbehavior without the atten-
dant jurisprudential muddle. This author respectfully invites the
Justices to reconsider their (mis)reasoning by analogy to real
property regulatory takings law. It is time to recognize that, at
times, we need to hold in check the twentieth-century tendency
to attack and collapse the distinctions and categories we have
inherited as part of our common-law legacy. At this relatively
early stage in the development of personal property regulatory
takings jurisprudence, the Justices can make (or, rather, restore)
a difference that matters.
119. See, e.g., supra note 60; Bibas, supra note 73, at 2460 ("Congress should
clean up the muddled state of the law by adopting a bright-line rule."); Stephanie
Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on
Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 450 (1999) ("This
Note advocates that Congress suspend the statute of limitations for plaintiffs suing
to reclaim possession of artwork that was looted by the Nazis.").
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